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“Like the public realm (Öffentlichkeit), the autonomy of art is a category of 
bourgeois society that both reveals and obscures an actual historical 
development. All discussion of this category must be judged by the extent to 
which it succeeds in showing and explaining logically and historically the  
contradictions inherent in the thing itself.”  
Peter Bürguer, Theory of the Avant-garde, 1974 
 
“This is not a time for political art, but politics as migrated into autonomous art, 
and nowhere more so than where it seems to be politically dead.” 
Th. Adorno, Aesthetics and Politics, (1962) 1977 
 
 
 
                                               
1 This title paraphrases James Elkins’ study on The Strange Place of 
Religion on Contemporary Art (New York: Routledge, 2004). In Elkins 
own words, “this book is a speculative attempt to describe why serious 
religious art that represents major religions is largely excluded from the 
art world. Why do the major venues of international art, and the principal 
journals and historians, consider only work that is ambiguous, ironic, or 
critical in relation to the major religions?” (see 
http://saic.academia.edu/JElkins/Books) 
2  This paper was delivered as invited conference at the ESF SCSS 
Exploratory Workshop: Public Art And Its Distresses. From mainstream 
city marketing strategies to a tool for social regeneration. Milan (Italy), 21-
22 october 2010 
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SUMMARY 
 
This article is part of the idea, widely disseminated, that the concept of 
public art radically challenges the concepts of autonomous work of art. 
Then considers more specifically, the strangeness that notion, that the 
Public Art is not a territory at the disposal of free artistic creation, on 
the contrary, it has to be adapted to the complex and demanding of 
public space, generates in field of contemporary art theory, even in the 
minds of critics who, as Rosalind Krauss, fought the essentialist roots of 
autonomy envisaged by modernism and supported the artists in front 
"of anti-aesthetic"3. 
 
RESUMEN 
Este artículo parte de la idea, ampliamente difundida, de que el 
concepto de arte público desafía radicalmente los conceptos de obra 
de arte autónoma. Luego considera más específicamente, la 
extrañeza que la noción, que el arte público no es un territorio a 
disposición de la creación artística libre, por el contrario, tiene que 
adaptarse a las complejas y exigentes demandas del espacio público, 
genera en campo de la teoría del arte contemporáneo, incluso en las 
mentes de los críticos que, como Rosalind Krauss, que combate  las 
raíces esencialistas de la autonomía predicada por el modernismo y 
con el apoyo de los artistas frente a la "anti-estética" 
                                               
3 For an extensive analysis on the implications and developments of this 
debate see A. Remesar, Para una Teoría del Arte Público: Proyectos y 
Lenguajes Escultóricos. – Barcelona: UB, 1997 (Memoria para el 
concurso de catedra). A. Remesar asserts: “To maintain an idea of public 
art as art for/in public spaces allows this paradigmatic situation […] where 
the artist acts as a demiurge […] to endure. It allows us to conceive 
public space as merely one of the available spheres of action in 
contemporary art, leaving unattended the necessary adjustments of this 
filed to a broader context, one that is not solely dependent on art world’s 
proxys.” (p. 19). 
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RESUMO 
Este artículo parte de la idea, ampliamente difundida, que el concepto 
de arte público desafía radicalmente los conceptos de obra de arte 
autónoma. Luego considera más específicamente, la extrañeza que la 
noción de que el arte público no es un territorio a disposición de la 
creación artística libre, por el contrario, tiene que adaptarse a las 
complejas y exigentes del espacio público, genera en el campo teoría 
del arte contemporáneo, incluso en las mentes de los críticos que, 
como Rosalind Krauss, de combate a las raíces esencialistas de la 
autonomía prevista por el modernismo y con el apoyo de los artistas 
frente "de lucha contra la estética" 
” 
 
This paper carries on the widely known assertion that Public 
Art challenges the main assumptions of contemporary art 
theory because it, dramatically challenges the autonomic 
conception of creative work. I am specifically reporting 
myself to the idea that public art cannot be merely thought 
as yet another available ground for contemporary art. That, 
on the contrary, public art has to adapt itself to the complex 
and demanding context of the public space, where artists 
should never be allowed to freely play their creative will 
Despite the efforts of the “anti-aesthetic” forefront of 
the 1960’s and 1970’s and of the critics that first supported 
them  (identified with the circle of historians and critics 
joined around the October journal) in the early 1980’s, or 
those undertaken by sociologists in order to show its 
presumed deceptiveness (Bourdieu’s work being the major 
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reference4), or even the putative successful developments of 
“relational aesthetics” (vide the recent exhibition held at 
MACBA), the aesthetic principle of autonomy has not been 
truly overcome. In fact it underwrites core art theory 
thinking, clarifying for instance the terms of the pervasive 
sense of reductionism attributed to sociological approaches 
such as Bourdieu’s. 
As is well known, the notion of art’s autonomy was at 
the very heart of the project of Modernity. Referencing M. 
Weber’s work, J. Habermas calls our attention to the fact 
that the philosophers of the Enlightenment joined “their 
efforts to develop objective science, universal morality and 
law, and autonomous art according to their inner logic”5. 
The construction of an autonomous sphere of art was then 
achieved, after a long and demanding struggle, and would be 
reinforced in subsequent decades. Beaux Art Academies had 
a definitive institutional role to play throughout the 18th, and 
19th centuries in this matter. Another major part of the 
credits is due to the Modern aesthetic legacy (Kant in 
particular) and 19th century’s sophisticated defense of l’art 
pour l’art6. 
                                               
4 See as an example P. Bourdieu, Les regles de l’art. – Paris: Seuil, 1992. 
5 “Modernity – An Incomplete Project”, The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on 
Postmodern Culture (ed. Hal Foster). – Seattle: Bay Press, 1993 [1983], 
p.9 
6 As Habermas puts it: “ By the time of Baudelaire, who repeated this 
promesse de bonheur via art, the utopia of reconciliation with society had 
gone sour. A relation of opposites had come into being; art had become a 
critical mirror, showing the irreconcialiable nature of aesthetic and social 
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I will not go back to observe the basis of German idealism, I 
promise (I am not a philosopher; just an art historian who 
believes that we cannot think about practice without theory). 
Nor will I examine Bourdieu’s sociological critique or the 
foundations of relational aesthetics. Instead, I want to 
consider the abiding validation of an autonomous sphere of 
art in late 20th century art theory and criticism, a validation 
underwrote by those who were in fact committed with 
artistic practices engaged with breaking up modernism’s 
hideous ivory tower7. This unexpected contradiction is very 
much embedded in the highly influential discourse of the 
“October” forefront. The urge of surpassing the idealist 
conception of art associated with Clement Greenberg’s 
criticism put the aesthetic discourse of autonomy into to 
question and worked to deny “the idea of a privileged 
aesthetic realm”. As Hal Foster also puts it in his famous 
                                                                                                                               
worlds. This modernist transformation was all the more painfully realized, 
the more art alienated itself from life and withdrew into the 
untouchableness of complete autonomy. Out of such emotional currents 
finally gathered those explosive energies which unloaded in the surrealist 
attempt to blow up the autarkical sphere of art and to force a 
reconciliation of art and life” (idem: 10). 
7 An ivory tower epitomized in statements like: “(…) modernism has 
dispensed not only with historical narratives, but with all narrative, to 
achieve the stunning simultaneity of the experience of the work itself, the 
picture as pure aesthetic object”; R. Krauss, “Richard Serra: Sculpture”, 
Richard Serra (ed. Hal Foster with Gordon Hughes). – Massachusetts: 
MIT, 2000, p. 101. 
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introduction to the Anti-aesthetic…8, insisting on the 
reconsideration of “the very notion of the aesthetic” meant 
to withdraw the belief “that aesthetic experience exists 
apart, without ‘purpose’, all but beyond history”. In other 
words, the anti-aesthetics discharge of notions as 
disinterested interest and purposeless purpose responded to 
the urge of overcoming an essentialist notion of the 
aesthetic, one that had set its foundations on Greenberg’s 
particular (mis)interpretation of Kant’s thought.9 This 
rightful debate did not however prompt a radical leap 
outside the world of aesthetic. I reckon it could not do so, for 
a successful overcoming of the autonomous force of 
aesthetic would seriously endanger – this being no doubt the 
core issue – the required basis of artistic resistance.10 
                                               
8 All quotations from Hal Foster, “Postmodernism: A Preface”, The Anti-
Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture (ed. Hal Foster). – Seattle: Bay 
Press, 1993 [1983], p. xv 
9 Following D. Costello’s analysis on this matter one becomes aware that 
Greenberg’s claim that Kant was the first real modernist (in Modernist 
Painting, 1960) was based on the misleading reading of his third Critique. 
Firstly, Greenberg attempts to apply Kant’s account of pure (or 
disinterested) aesthetic judgment, a judgment about the aesthetic feeling 
aroused by “free” (or conceptually unconstrained) beauty, to works of art 
without taking into consideration that this account takes natural beauty 
and decorative motives (their “purposeless purpose”) as its paradigm. 
Secondly, and perhaps with more decisive results, Greenberg “tends to 
empiricize and psychologize Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgment. See D. 
Costello,  
10 Hal Foster contrasts a postmodernism of reaction from a 
postmodernism of resistance; see “Postmodernism: A Preface”, The Anti-
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J. Habermas sets the terms of this danger while criticizing 
the radical attempt to negate art underpinned by Surrealists. 
He therefore calls our attention to the fact that the efforts of 
the avant-garde “ended up ironically by giving due exactly to 
these categories through which Enlightenment aesthetics 
had circumscribe its object domain”. Habermas writes, 
moreover “when the containers of an autonomously 
developed cultural sphere are shattered, the contents get 
dispersed. Nothing remains from a desublimated meaning or 
a deconstructed form; an emancipatory effect does not 
follow”. 
We are thus facing the riddle thoroughly analyzed in 
Peter Bürguer’s famous essay Theory of the Avant-garde (1st 
published in 1974).  In the context of the bourgeois society, 
autonomy of art has permitted the description of art’s 
detachment from the context of practical life as a natural 
historical development. Precisely here, says Bürguer, lies its 
untruth because the appearance of this category as 
naturalized history conceals its historical construction and 
social conditioning. So the author concludes: “The category 
of ‘autonomy’ does not permit the understanding of its 
referent as one that developed historically. The relative 
dissociation of the work of art from the praxis of life in 
bourgeois society thus becomes transformed into the 
(erroneous) idea that the work of art is totally independent 
                                                                                                                               
Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture (ed. Hal Foster). – Seattle: Bay 
Press, 1993 [1983], p. xii. 
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of society. In the strict meaning of the term, ‘autonomy’ is 
thus an ideological [in classical Marxist terms] category 
that joints an element of truth (the apartness of art from the 
praxis of life) and an element of untruth (the hypostatization 
of this fact, which is a result of historical development as the 
‘essence’ of art).”11 
Reviewing the avant-garde’s first attempts to overturn 
the autonomy of art, Bürguer summons back Herbert 
Marcuse’s remarks on how in the bourgeois society “all 
those needs that cannot be satisfied in everyday life (…) can 
find a home in art, because art is removed from the praxis of 
life. Values such as humanity, joy, truth, solidarity are 
extruded from life as it were, and preserved in art.”12 As a 
result, art has a contradictory role. In the one hand “it 
projects the image of a better order and to that extent 
protests against the bad order that prevails.” Yet in 
realizing a fictive image of a better order “it relieves the 
existing society of the pressure of those forces that make for  
change. They are assigned to confinement in an ideal 
sphere.”13  
Avant-garde’s attempts to reinstate art into life, on the 
other hand, offer a reverse effect: “For the (relative) 
freedom of art vis-à-vis the praxis of life is at the same time 
                                               
11 Peter Bürguer, Theory of the Avant-garde – English translation in Art in 
Modern Culture: an Anthology of Critical Texts (ed. F. Frascina and J. 
Harris). – London: Phaidon, 1992, p. 56-57. 
12 Idem, p. 59 
13 Idem. 
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the condition that must be fulfilled if there is to be a critical 
cognition of reality. An art no longer distinct from the praxis 
of life but wholly absorbed in it will loose the capacity to 
criticize it, along with its distance.”14  
In other words, (relative) autonomy is the condition for 
critical art, for an art of resistance.15  
I will insist on this riddle around the concept of autonomy, 
as I will insist that conceiving art as an autonomous sphere 
is an idea that was not overturned by late 20th century art 
theory, even though what is meant by autonomy has changed 
and is now striving against its idealist, or essentialist 
foundations in favor of an awareness on the historical 
construction of the concept.  
Moreover, I will maintain that for that reason we face a 
giant gap between art theory and those art practices that do 
not fit into the vindications of autonomy. (Needless to say 
that, in Adorno’s negative aesthetics, this would be nothing 
but the gap between art and cultural industry, or, in other 
                                               
14 Idem, p. 60 
15 This seems to be implicit even in the thorought critique Hal Foster 
directs to Bürguer’s Theory of the Avant-garde. At least it is not affected 
by the argument that “Bürguer takes the romantic rhetoric of the avant-
garde, of rupture and revolution, at its own word. In so doing he misses 
crucial dimentions of its practice. For example, he misses its mimetic 
dimension, whereby the avant-garde mimes the degraded world of 
capitalist modernity in order not to embrace it but to mock it (as in 
Cologne dada). He also misses its utopian dimention, whereby the avant-
garde proposes not what can be so much as what cannot be – again as a 
critique of what is (as in the Stijl)” (H. Foster, The Return of the Real. - 
Massachusetts: MIT, 1996, pp. 15-16) 
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words, between art and non-art). 
Public art is a particularly suited field to look into if 
one has this gap in mind. For the sake of this account I will 
briefly focus my attention in two major references of almost 
every theoretical account on this domain: (1) Rosalind 
Krauss’ extraordinary writings on modern sculpture and her 
concept of a postmodernist “expanded field”16 and (2) the 
Tilted Arc episode (by episode I mean both the official 
decision of taking the piece apart and the terms of Richard 
Serra’s defence). These widely known references will, I 
hope, help me strengthen my argument on the grounds of the 
strange place of Public Art in contemporary art theory. 
 
On the expanded field of sculpture 
 
As is well known Krauss’ point on this essay cannot be 
understood without acknowledging her opposition to 
Greenberg’s paramount theory of Modernism. It has been 
keenly pointed out that her initial assertions on the 
overcoming of the monumental logic by modernist sculpture 
are closely connected to Greenberg’s perspective17. But her 
discourse strives to dismantle all Greenberg’s basic a priori 
                                               
16 Rosalind Krauss, “Sculpture in an expanded field”, The Anti-Aesthetic: 
Essays on Postmodern Culture (ed. Hal Foster). – Seattle: Bay Press, 
1993 [1983], pp. 31-42. 
17 See A. Remesar, Para una Teoría del Arte Público: Proyectos y 
Lenguajes Escultóricos. – Barcelona: UB, 1997 (Memoria para el 
concurso de catedra), pp. 158-164. 
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assumptions: both his historicist and deterministic notion of 
History, and his essentialist conception of Modernism.  
Krauss’ expanded field concept allows her to show that 
“within the situation of postmodernism, practice is not 
defined in relation to a given medium – sculpture – but 
rather in relation to the logical operations on a set of 
cultural terms, for which any medium – photography, books, 
lines on walls, mirrors, or sculpture itself – might be used” 
(p.41).  
Thus “the logic of the space of postmodernist practice 
is no longer organized around the definition of a given 
medium on the grounds of its material, or, for that matter, 
the perception of material. It is organized instead through 
the universe of terms that are felt to be in opposition within 
a cultural situation”(in the sense of Saussure’s definition of 
language as a system of oppositions). Krauss insists: “It 
follows, then, that within any of the positions generated by 
the given logical space, many different mediums might be 
employed”. 
Medium-specificity was the core assumption of 
Greenberg’s theory of modernism. Artistic value granted to 
modernist practice was dependent on an auto-referenced 
investigation, which means he  
identified medium-specificity with the pursue of aesthetic 
value in art.18 
In supporting the artistic value of post-medium 
                                               
18 Cf. Idem, p. 3 
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sculpture through a structural analysis of its expanded field 
Krauss radically challenges Greenberg’s essentialist concept 
of modernism19, as well as Michael Fried’s theoretical 
unfolding of its premises.20 She successfully denounces the 
reductionism of medium-specificity as the essential inner 
logic of grand art’s narrative. Nevertheless, her “anti-
aesthetic postmodernism” while taking a crucial stand 
against idealist conceptions and the parochial definition of 
artistic disciplines does not refuse the idea of art being an (at 
least relatively) autonomous sphere. If she did so, she would 
jeopardize art’s critical power. 
Accordingly, Krauss’ appraisal of Serra’s 
phenomenological turn – of his sculptural elaboration of the 
perceptual field she writes – acknowledges his successful 
opposition to the presumption that art is about symbolic 
totalities defined between the walls of enclosed disciplines. 
In Serra’s case, site-specificity is part of the expanded field 
of sculpture. Following Krauss’ writing, site-specificity in 
works such as the Tilted Arc is taken to be “not the subject 
of the work but – in its articulation of the movement of the 
viewer’s body-in-destination – it’s a medium”.21 Yet this 
                                               
19 For a critical perspective on the success of Krauss’s response to 
Greenberg see D. Costello (idem) 
20 Michael Fried, “Art and Objecthood” (1967), Minimal Art: A Critical 
Anthology (ed. G. Battcock). – New York: Dutton, 1968 
21 R. Krauss, “Richard Serra: Sculpture”, Richard Serra (ed. Hal Foster 
with Gordon Hughes). – Massachusetts: MIT, 2000, (October Files) p. 
140. 
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does not affect the assumption that Serra creates a unique 
experience, one that frees sculpture from the commoditized 
world of everyday life on no other basis than its autonomous 
condition. I mean sculpture’s critical force, its ability to 
resist. 
 
 
On the (invisible) critical power of site-specificity 
 
Site-specificity is therefore a core argument in “anti-
aesthetic” approaches to Serra’s work. As Krauss clearly 
states by taking site-specificity as its medium, Serra’s 
sculpture moves in on a theoretical dimension also 
acknowledged by every other contributors of the October 
Files book on Serra.22 The crucial value of this assertion is 
thus anticipated by the announcement of the expanded field 
of sculpture as breaking away with an idealist concept of 
sculpture. Yve-Alain Bois’ sharp synthesis of this question 
begins by recalling the impact of Fried’s vehement attack on 
minimalism23, and states “all Serra’s work is an implicit 
reply to Michael Fried’s text”, meaning that his 
phenomenological conception of sculpture is in a deliberate 
opposition to the “essential goal of modernist art, and of 
sculpture in particular”, i.e. to affirm through medium-
                                               
22 Richard Serra (ed. Hal Foster with Gordon Hughes). – Massachusetts: 
MIT, 2000 (October Files) 
23 Published as “Art and Objecthood” (1967); see above note 19. 
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specificity “its autonomy in relation to (…) real space”.24  
It is against this fallacious idealist conception that 
Serra operates and sophisticatedly reinforces the ground of 
his work, specially the ground of his public sculpture. 
Unavailable to accept art as an enclosed totality validated by 
its inner formal properties, Serra affirms during the Tilted 
Arc crisis: “to remove the work is to destroy the work”.25 It 
is strictly against medium-specificity theoretical settings that 
Serra’s site-specificity is thus elaborated (I cannot help to 
find the presence of the term specificity in both expressions 
a bit disturbing though).  
My question here does not work to assess the paucity 
of aestheticized (idealist) notions of site-specificity but to 
argue that taking site-specificity as a sculptural medium, 
even if informed by rigorous phenomenological awareness, 
is to reclaim an autonomous status to sculpture by way of at 
least two presuppositions: 
1) Even though we must now consider that the 
“coordinates of perception were established as existing 
not only between the spectator and the work but among 
                                               
24 Yve-Alain Bois, “A Picturesque Stroll around Clara-Clara”, Richard 
Serra (ed. Hal Foster with Gordon Hughes). – Massachusetts: MIT, 2000 
(October Files), p. 82 
25 This statement of R. Serra is repeatedly evoqued in D. Crimp’s 
“Redefining Site Specificity”, Richard Serra (ed. Hal Foster with Gordon 
Hughes). – Massachusetts: MIT, 2000 (October Files), p.148, n.2 
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spectator, art work, and the place inhabited by both”26, 
and that in belonging to its site the work loses its 
stability and can no longer be appreciated as a bounded 
totality, the presumption of a distinguishable domain 
of sculpture remains clearly untouched.27 The idea that 
sculpture faces a set of specific (inner) critical 
questions is very much present in Serra’s own 
discourse regarding his work: namely his complete 
refusal to collaborate with architecture28, and his 
                                               
26 Douglas Crimp, “Redefining Site Specificity”, Richard Serra (ed. Hal 
Foster with Gordon Hughes). – Massachusetts: MIT, 2000 (October 
Files), p. 151. 
27 Douglas Crimp considers this question and tries to distinguish the 
uncompleted attempt to overcome an idealist conception of sculpture 
made by minimalists from the radicalized site-specificity taken up in the 
work of artists such as Daniel Buren, Hans Haacke, Michael Asher, 
Lawrence Weiner, Robert Smithson, and of course Richard Serra. He 
also writes: “Their contribution to a materialist critique of art, their 
resistance to the ‘disintegration of culture into commodities’, were 
fragmentary and provisional, the consequences limited, systematically 
opposed or mystified , ultimately overturned. What remains of this critique 
today are a history of to be recovered and fitful marginalized practices 
that struggle to exist at all in an art world more dedicated than ever 
before to commodity value” (D. Crimp, “Redefining Site Specificity”, 
Richard Serra (ed. Hal Foster with Gordon Hughes). – Massachusetts: 
MIT, 2000 (October Files), p. 152. 
28 “There seems to be in this country [United States] right now, especially 
in sculpture, a tendency to make work which attends to architecture. I am 
not interested in work which is structurally ambiguous, or in sculpture 
which satisfies urban design principles. I have always found that to be not 
only an aspect of mannerism but a need to reinforce a status quo of 
existing aesthetics. 
“I am interested in sculpture which is non-utilitarian, non-functional. . . any 
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conception of the public as a public for (his) 
sculpture.29  
 
2) Theoretical and critical discourse recognizes and 
praises Serra’s right to disrupt the public space, 
because it firmly believes that the aesthetic 
significance of art arises from its inner critical power – 
i.e. what Kant considered its ability both to resist and 
denounce “mechanical nature” and to free itself from 
the “culture of disciplines”30. Douglas Crimp’s 
                                                                                                                               
use is a misuse.” (R. Serra, “Rigging,” interview with Gerard 
Hovagymyan, in Richard Serra: Interviews, Etc. 1970-1980 Yonkers, N.Y: 
Hudson River Museum, 1980), p.128 
29 Michael Kelly writes about Tilted Arc’ site-specificity stating:  “Serra did 
not regard the public who experienced Tilted Arc as people who had 
legitimate, aesthetic and other claims on Federal Plaza. He was actually 
rather candid on this issue: ‘If you are conceiving a piece for a public 
place, a place and space that people walk through, one has to consider 
the traffic flow.’ So Serra thought of the ‘public’ as ‘traffic’, as anonymous 
people who were taken into consideration only insofar as they could be 
expected to have peripatetic perceptual experiences of his sculpture in a 
behavioral space of his design: ‘The work I make does not allow for 
experience outside the conventions of sculpture as sculpture.’ Tilted Arc 
was situated to encompass ‘the people who walk on the plaza as its 
volume ... to bring the viewer into the sculpture.’” (M. Kelly, “Public Art 
Controversy: The Serra and Lin Cases”, The Journal of Aesthetics and 
Art Criticism, Vol. 54, N. 1 (Winter, 1996), p. 17. 
30 We unexpectedly rejoin Kant’s aesthetic on account of Gregg 
Horowitz’s assertion that the 3rd Critique attributes to art a perennial 
condition of resistance and hence announces modernism. We return to 
Kant but, of course, in a reading completely detached from Greenberg’s 
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analysis is, from where I stand, very elucidating, 
specially when he writes: “In reorienting the use of 
Federal Plaza from a place of traffic control to one of 
sculpture, Serra once again used sculpture to hold its 
site hostage, to insist upon the necessity for art to fulfil 
its own functions rather than those relegated to it by its 
governing institutions and discourses.”31  
 
I reckon that the main problem of this post-idealist critical 
conceptions of sculpture as an expanded field, and by 
extension those of art in the public space, is that the very 
notion of public, although not exclusively pondered on the 
basis of reception32, is still very much thought as relying on 
an a priori (and hierarchical) idea that art is about art – i.e. 
that it can only emerge within the bounded set of the critical 
questions that both problematize and reaffirm its 
autonomous condition and therefore set its ability to resist.  
That is why we should recall once more, now following 
Jacques Rancière, that the preservation “of the autonomy of 
art from all forms of power and aestheticization”, was never 
“in order to preserve it for the pure enjoyment of art for its 
                                                                                                                               
interpretation. See Gregg Horowitz, Sustaining Loss: Art and Mournful 
Life. – Standford: Standford University Press, 2001. pp. 25-55. 
31 Douglas Crimp, “Redefining Site Specificity”, Richard Serra (ed. Hal 
Foster with Gordon Hughes). – Massachusetts: MIT, 2000 (October 
Files), p.168 
32 As in W. Benjamin optimiscal diagnosis on the critical reception of post-
auratic autonomous art. 
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own sake but, on the contrary, as the inscription of the 
unresolved contradiction between the aesthetic promise and 
the realities of oppression in the world.”33  
Needless to say that we achieve a dead end, one that 
only art, public art I mean, has the means to overturn 
(answers never depend on theory, only diagnosis and 
questions do). Particularly at stake here is the ability of the 
participative forms of intervention in the public realm – 
those dependent not of an oppositional effect, but on social 
consensus – to outshine the pervasive disbelief on their 
aesthetical pregnancy.  
One cannot but wait for public art’s power to overturn 
its alien place in art theory. 
 
 
 
                                               
33 Jacques Rancière, Aesthetics and its discontents. – Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2009, p. 129  
